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I. Bulls and Bears
One of the timeliest and most prescient books
I’ve come across in the last fifteen years is Edward
Chancellor’s popular history of financial speculation
Devil take the Hindmost. Chancellor had worked as
an investment banker for Lazard Brothers in London and had contributed to the Financial Times and
The Economist and so was well acquainted with what
he called “This Bubble World” (3), echoing the poet
Francis Quarles’s seventeenth-century work Emblems.
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“What’s lighter than the mind,” Quarles asked, “A
thought. Than thought? This bubble world” (qtd. in
Chancellor 3). Chancellor’s pleasant book itself is
“light” reading, certainly not a work of philosophy,
as I had been used to, with its dizzying arguments,
something less than that as a thought is less than the
mind. And yet not quite a scholarly history, where
ideas take on the dramatic role of players, something
less than that. What is less than that? The thing called
speculation and our derivative world of modernity.
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For all intents and purposes, Chancellor’s book
starts with the seventeenth century and Joseph de la
Vega’s Confusion de Confusiones, the first description
of stock market activity in Western Europe in 1688
(11-14). After brief remarks about the scant classical and medieval precursors, Chancellor presents
stock market speculation as bursting onto the scene
fully formed, like some early modern Athena from
the head of Zeus. And it’s telling that Chancellor is
most concerned with the speculative psychology as
presented in de la Vega’s work, which approximates
what we nowadays call manic-depression (13). The
compulsiveness, the superstitions, and even the bulls
and bears were there from the beginning, he says,
“the liefhebbers (‘lifter’s up’ . . . ) who were ‘scared of
nothing’” and “the contremines (‘underminers’ . . .),
who were ‘completely ruled by fear, trepidation, and
nervousness’” (Chancellor 12). Certainly some (if not
most) of the participants vacillated between the two,
“exhibit[ing] signs of split personality” (Chancellor
12). Indeed, de la Vega himself had observed that
“there are many occasions in which every speculator
seems to have two bodies, so that astonished observers see a human fighting himself” (qtd. in Chancellor
12).
To Chancellor, this recalled nothing so much as the
behavior observed by Charles Cotton in his Compleat
Gamester, first published in 1674 and again in 1680
(11). As the epigraph to Chancellor’s preface makes
clear, speculation is nothing but gambling. Sir Ernest
Cassell, banker to Edward VII, recalled that “when I
was young, people called me gambler. As the scale of
my operations increased, I became known as a speculator.” “Now I am called a banker,” he says, “but I have
been doing the same thing all along” (qtd. in Chancellor ix).
As a fellow at UNLV’s Center for Gaming Research,
I had privileged access to Special Collections which
included a second edition of Cotton’s manual. David
Schwartz, in his wonderful history of gambling, tells
us that the field of “how-to” books had been opened
initially by Cardano but in the seventeenth century
the market had exploded with French gambling manuals appearing as early as 1647, English translations
in 1651, and then English manuals proper (167). I am
particularly taken with certain passages from the first
chapter of Cotton’s volume, “Of Gaming in General,”
in which he describes the “miserable Gamester” (3).
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“This restless man,” he says, “is the proper subject of
every man’s pity. Restless I call him, because (such is
the itch of play) either winning or losing he can never
rest satisfied, if he wins he thinks to win more, if he
loses he hopes to recover” (Cotton 3). “Thus,” Cotton
writes, “have I heard of some who with Five pounds
have won Four Hundred pounds in one night, and
the next Night have lost it to a sum not half so much;
others who have lost their estates and won them
again with addition, yet could not be quiet till they
lost them irrecoverably” (3). Indeed, “gaming hath
this ill property above all other Vices, that it renders
a man incapable of prosecuting any serious action,
and makes him always unsatisfied with his own condition,” for “he is either lifted up to of mad joy with
success, or plunged to the bottom of despair by misfortune, always in extremes, always in a storm” (1).
This talk of restlessness, confined here to the
gamester, recalls certain moments from the history
of philosophy. Consider Spinoza, for instance, the
philosopher of Amsterdam, and his Theological-Political Treatise published anonymously in 1670 and
then posthumously in 1677, contemporaneous with
Cotton’s Gamester and roughly ten years before de la
Vega’s Confusiones. The Treatise begins by claiming
that “men would never be superstitious, if they could
govern all their circumstances by set rules, or if they
were always favoured by fortune,” seeming impossibilities (Spinoza 3). “But,” he continues, as it is,
being frequently driven into straits where rules are
useless, and being often kept fluctuating pitiably
between hope and fear by the uncertainty of fortune’s greedily coveted favours, they are consequently, for the most part, very prone to credulity
. . . especially when hope and fear are struggling
for mastery. (Spinoza 3)

Spinoza jokes that everyone recognizes this as
fact about his neighbor—not himself, of course—for
everybody knows that “most people, when in prosperity, are so over-brimming with wisdom (however
inexperienced they may be), that they take every offer
of advice as a personal insult, whereas in adversity
they know not where to turn, but beg and pray for
counsel from every passer-by” (3).
Notice the similarities between Cotton’s gamester, Spinoza’s average joe, and de la Vega’s stock
operator: the extremes of joy and despondency,
the winner’s restless “hope” (or greed) that his
winnings will increase indefinitely and the flail-
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ing loser who will not satisfied until he lose it all
irrecoverably, the illusion of complete self-sufficiency followed by the illusion of wretchedness,
the ultimate bad beat, casting about for saviors on
every corner. “Always in extremes,” Cotton writes,
“always in a storm.” “The proper subject of every
man’s pity” is himself, along with the rest of us, for
we are all speculators on the verge of wreck. We are
all in the exact same boat.
II. Looking on the Wreck
I want to talk about ships and storms for a moment. After Cotton’s discussion of the restlessness of
gamesters, he concludes the following: “And therefore
fitly was that question propounded, Whether men in
Ships at Sea were to be accounted among the living or the
dead, because there were but few inches between them
and drowning” (3). “The same [inquiry] may be made
of great Gamesters,” he casually adds, “though their
estates be never so considerable, Whether they are to
esteemed poor or rich, since there are but few Casts
at Dice betwixt a rich man (in that circumstance) and
a beggar” (Cotton 3).
Cotton’s original audience may have been reminded of that great shipwreck, The Tempest, originally
performed in 1611, first printed as the opening play
of Shakespeare’s collected works in 1623, and then
radically revamped by Davenant and Dryden in 1667
(published three years later). The play begins at sea
in the middle of a storm. A ship is carrying Alonso,
the king of Naples, his brother, and other nobles. The
opening lines, however, are not spoken by a noble
but by the master of the boat, who basically hands
over control of the situation, what little there is, to
his subordinate the boatswain. In the middle of the
action, which is intense, the ship in serious danger of
capsizing, the boatswain is interrupted (is repeatedly
interrupted) by the noblemen, the king himself first
of all.
The king asks where the master is, and the boatswain responds: “Do you not hear him? You mar our
labour. Keep your cabins! You do assist the storm”
(Shakespeare 144). Gonzalo, a wise old counselor,
tries to quiet the boatswain down—“nay, good be
patient” (Shakespeare 144)—but the sailor will have
none of it: “When the sea is! Hence. What cares these
roarers for the name of the king? To cabin! Silence!
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Trouble us not” (Shakespeare 145). Gonzalo, still
trying to smooth things over, cautions the man to remember his noble cargo: “Good, yet remember whom
thou hast on board” (Shakespeare 145). Still frantically working, trying to keep the ship from splitting
apart, the boatswain had enough: “None that I more
love than myself” (Shakespeare 145). “You are a
councilor,” he says to Gonzalo, “if you can command
these elements to silence and work the peace of the
present, we will not hand a rope more. Use your
authority!” (Shakespeare 145). If you can command
the sea and storm, he’s saying, then do it, if not “give
thanks that you have lived so long and make yourself
ready in your cabin for the mischance of the hour, if
it so hap” (Shakespeare 145). If you can help, do it; if
you can’t, get out of the way—go below and get ready
to die.
The noblemen are shocked by the boatswain’s behavior and heap abuse on him: “A pox o’ your throat,
you bawling, blasphemous, incharitable dog,” says
Sebastian; Antonio shouts: “Hang, cur! Hang, you
whoreson, insolent noise-maker! We are less afraid to
be drowned than thou art” (Shakespeare 147). Everyone fears the worst, but Gonzalo, the wise, finds
some comfort in the boatswain’s comportment: “I
have a great comfort from this fellow. Methinks he
hath no drowning mark upon him—his complexion
is perfect gallows” (Shakespeare 145-146). Gonzalo
thinks that the boatswain has a look of destiny about
him and that the fate of someone so insolent as this
cannot be an anonymous watery grave but rather
must be the hangman’s noose. His destiny is not anonymity, but infamy, which is lucky for everyone else
on the ship. “I’ll warrant him for drowning,” he says,
“though the ship were no stronger than a nutshell
and as leaky as an unstained wench” (Shakespeare
147). For “warrant,” the Arden Shakespeare cites the
Oxford English Dictionary: to guarantee or ensure (a
person something)—in this case, Gonzalo offers to
ensure the mariner against drowning. Certainly, gamblers are familiar with Gonzalo’s practice, offering
a player insurance against the unlikely event of his
pocket kings losing to queens and the like. The wise
man, in essence, thinks drowning so unlikely for the
boatswain that he’s willing to assume the man’s risk.
Of course if he’s wrong, then no one will be around
to collect. Except that he is wrong, and they survive
nevertheless.
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One of the things that interest me about this scene
is the way in which it brings together Cotton’s two
questions: whether men in ships were to be accounted
among the living and the dead and whether the great
gamesters at their tables are to be esteemed poor or
rich. In the opening scene of the The Tempest, the
moral seems clear: in a crisis, the confusion of a storm,
when only a few timbers separate the living man from
the dead, the social distinctions of everyday life count
for very little or nothing at all. The boatswain, a poor
man, is worth more than that paradigmatic rich man,
the king (he is, ironically, worth more to the king than
the king himself). Even the wisdom of a Gonzalo is for
naught if he lacks the power over nature to go with it,
if he cannot command the elements. But for the average joe of Spinoza’s preface, who is so frequently driven to such straits: doesn’t it seem that we are almost
always in a crisis, always an inch away from disaster or,
for that matter, glory?
In Cotton’s description of the gamester, the two
questions are simply placed side by side; in Spinoza’s preface, the questions are enveloped, as it were,
by the philosophical question—the situation of the
mariner and the gamester are instances of a more
general situation, that which the vast majority of
people always or almost inevitably find themselves
in; in Shakespeare’s The Tempest, the questions of
the mariner and of the gamester collapse into one
scene, the wreck enacted before our eyes. So it comes
as no surprise that de la Vega himself, before passing to a fuller description of bull and bear psychologies, speaks of the stock exchange environment as a
“storm” threatening the operators’ leaky vessel and
then, a couple of paragraphs later, as a “gambling
hell” (161-162). Indeed, de la Vega the operator will
turn almost Shakespearean, collapsing gamester and
mariner, at least those of whom are pathological, in
one image: “Oh, how many sick persons are there in
the stock-gambling who resemble the fool, who throw
themselves into this sea [of speculation] and who,
when the waters reach their necks, return to firm
ground” (188).
III. The Bosom of Abraham
In some way, these representations derive from or
at least recall the two parables of Lazarus. The first
one, mentioned in Luke, is the parable of the rich
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man, Dives, and the poor man, Lazarus. Completed in
1611, the King James Bible gives:
There was a certain rich man, which was clothed
in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously
every day. And there was a certain beggar named
Lazarus, which was laid at his gate, full of sores,
And desiring to be fed with the crumbs which fell
from the rich man’s table . . . . And it came to pass,
that the beggar died, and was carried by the angels
into Abraham’s bosom: the rich man also died, and
was buried; And in hell he lift up his eyes . . . and
seeth Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his bosom.
And he cried and said, Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send Lazarus, that he may dip the
tip of his finger in water, and cool my tongue . . . .
(Luke 16: 19-24)

Unmoved, Abraham concludes with a terrible
moral: “Son, remember that thou in thy lifetime
receivedst thy good things, and likewise Lazarus evil
things: but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented” (Luke 16: 25). We are left wondering, like
Cotton, whether the rich man, the great gamester in
his royal purple, was to be esteemed wealthy in life
or not, since Abraham can make Lazarus, who isn’t,
at least seemingly, presented here as a remarkably
virtuous man—he’s simply poor—since Abraham can
make a king of Lazarus, a pauper of Dives.
It’s an open question as to whether the Lazarus of
Luke is the same Lazarus who is raised from the dead
in John (most, I think, tend to separate the two). In
this second story, the emphasis is not on riches versus poverty, but on health and life, on the one hand,
and sickness and death, on the other; the emphasis
is on a power that triumphs over sickness and death
and that operates in this world, so that Lazarus is not
raised on high, but instead restored to his earthly sister and family. There seems to be so little difference
between death and life, in this world, that according
to Martha, her brother Lazarus would not have died
had Jesus been there—even so, he need only roll
away the stone that blocks Lazarus’s tomb in order to
restore him (John 11: 1-44).
What is clear, though, is that in the seventeenth
century people wanted also, perhaps increasingly, to
see the rich man Dives become the pauper Lazarus
and vice versa in this world. Schwartz notes that
“with the introduction of bank games and the proliferation of professional gambling houses, a gambling
mania swept over much of Europe . . . [and] that from
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1650 to 1800 gambling occupied a place in European society far more prominent than before or since”
(93). It’s true—there had always been gambling, but
now “it was common on a level never before seen”
(Schwartz 93). With the opening of the Ridotto in
1638, the first state-sanctioned public gambling
house in European history, the state had found a
way to capitalize on this fever. On the model of the
late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century ridotti,
where nobles no longer simply permitted gambling as
before but actually profited from it by raking a portion of the money staked, the state cemented an unprecedented alliance with “mercantile gamblers, who
ran games for profit, and government, who sought to
legitimize the gamblers for purposes of public order
and revenue enhancement” (Schwartz 95).
Europe had long had its carnivals, its saturnalia,
with their Lords of Misrule and boy bishops. The
world was temporarily turned upside down, the rich
made poor and poor made rich, the noble made base
and the ignoble gentile. All this was a temporary
subversion of the social life, ultimately conservative
of the status quo temporarily flaunted. But gambling
at the Ridotto was like a carnival within the general
carnival atmosphere, where these things weren’t just
simulated, but where they happened for real. This
was carnival gone wild, and it could be turned to the
advantage of the state not only in its carnivalesque
quality—that, for the most part, had been the case
already—but this virtual storm, a mixture of “nobles,
prostitutes, pimps, userers, police informants, . . .
degenerate gamblers . . . [along with] curious visitors”
(Schwartz 96)—this tempest could be turned to the
State’s advantage in more ways than catharsis.
So if Spinoza’s average joe was “driven to such
straits”—by the way, my rudimentary sense of the
Latin text of the Treatise is that the translation
“straits” is a perfect English word to capture the
Latin, which literally means “narrowness,” including
any narrowness of the sea or land, and which figuratively means, interestingly enough “poverty” (or
a “pinch,” say). The language describing hope and
fear is of these extremes “buffeting” the man, so the
language even in Spinoza seems to hint of a possible
shipwreck. One is driven into these dangerous straits,
where he or she is likely to founder, wind-tossed by
the extremes of hope and fear such that one is as
likely to sink from the anxiety of it as from any rocks.
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In any event, if Spinoza’s average joe was driven into
straits where “rules” cease to command and in which
one is buffeted by the extremes of hope and fear—if
he was “driven to such straits,” it’s clear that in early modern Europe he was driving himself. And in
droves. Extremes of hope and fear weren’t something
to be purged, on the example of Aristotle’s theater,
but rather something people were clearly seeking out.
They didn’t want to be relieved from anxiety. They
wanted to be anxious. Not only was this not threatening to the state, it was potentially enriching.
Another difference between the previous gambling
and the kind now taking hold was the anonymity of
the encounter in this sense: this new mercantile gambling “let people play against an impersonal house
for the price of the house edge” (Schwartz 92). It was
no longer the case that if you and I gamble and you
win, I must lose, so that the effect of that encounter
spills out of the gambling house. My foe at the Ridotto was not a fellow player, but rather the house, so
that seemingly there’s really no particular person to
blame, no one to resent, if I lose (other than myself,
if I choose), but also no one to praise, no one to be indebted to, if I win (other than myself, if I choose). All
this is really rather ingenious: it combines the impersonality of the firing squad with one bullet (no one
knows who fired the fatal shot)—it’s better than the
firing squad because no one in particular fires that
fatal shot; it combines this with the impersonality of
a Father Christmas—it’s better than a Santa Claus because the presents do not depend on my being naughty or nice since no one in particular is giving them. It
is as impersonal and as amoral as a storm, and early
modern people wanted to enact the wreck or, alternately, to look on from a safe distance.
With this last remark, I’m echoing the great twentieth century German philosopher Hans Blumenberg.
In his first chapter from Shipwreck with Spectator,
“Seafaring as a Transgression of Boundaries,” he asks:
What could have motivated the move from land to
sea but a refusal of nature’s meager offerings, the
monotony of agricultural labor, plus the addictive vision of quickly won rewards, of more than
reason finds necessary (the latter being something
the philosophically inclined are always ready to
find a formula for)—the vision, that is, of opulence and luxury. (Blumenberg 9)

The idea, he adds, “that here, on the boundary between land and sea, what may not have been a fall but

6						

was certainly a misstep into the inappropriateness
and the immoderate was first taken, has the vividness
that sustains lasting topoi” (Blumenberg 9).
IV. The Falling Sickness
(or, the Storm Disease)
Almost from the beginning, the disease we call epilepsy was known sometimes as “the sacred disease”
but consistently as “the falling sickness,” for obvious
reasons. Hippocrates, Galen and Aristotle—the great
ancient medical authorities—knew it as both. The influence of these three philosophers, chiefly Galen and
Aristotle, continued to hold sway in Western medicine more or less until the mid to late sixteenth century, at which time their supremacy was challenged
by a new breed of doctor, the hermetic medicine of
Paracelsus and his followers. Nowadays, a lot of us,
unjustly, think of Paracelsus as some sort of alchemist quack—he was an alchemist, but no crank. At
the time, this “modern,” new-wave of medicine-men
vied in a most serious way, on some fronts successfully, with the old guard.
And one of the most important, if not the chief
battleground of that war was epilepsy (Temkin 172).
The traditional medicine’s stunning lack of success
in this area, its almost complete inability to offer
effective treatments for this disease, much less
cures—indeed, many within the tradition thought it
incurable—this was a noticeable sore spot. Bernard
of Gordon, for instance, summed up the resigned,
traditional attitude nicely (and reasonably) when he
admitted:
Nevertheless, I tell you, concerning epilepsy, that
I have had in my treatment many people, young
and old, rich and poor, men and women, suffering
from almost every kind of epilepsy—Yet I have not
one seen any one cured either by me or by another
. . . [despite the fact that] I have been very careful
in everything and the patients obedient. (qtd. in
Temkin 165)

He concludes by cautioning physicians against
making promises, for the falling sickness “is eradicated [only] with great difficulty—if indeed it can be
eradicated at all” (qtd. in Temkin 165). In the words
of Owsei Temkin, which recall Cotton’s remarks on
the gamester, “the epileptic was therefore considered
[among all] a poor wretch, deserving pity” (165). But
Paracelsus and the new breed were not so resigned
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and in fact accused the old guard of quackery. Doctors, Paracelsus wrote, who thrive on slight diseases
which (basically) cure themselves, but pretend that
the “falling sickness” is incurable are frauds, for God
had provided remedies for all diseases (Temkin 171).
Clearly, if the early modern hermeticists could succeed in this area where the old-guard always failed,
then the upstart medicine could be legitimated in
spectacular fashion.
It turns out that Paracelsus and his followers saw
a very intimate link between storms and epilepsy.
Indeed, thinking that man’s body was a microcosm
mirror of the macrocosm as a whole, they reasoned
that epilepsy was very literally a thunderstorm of the
body, and that in order to understand it, we needed to think about how thunderstorms originate in
nature and treat the disease, in large part, through
chemical means (Temkin 173-174). In its insistence
on the analogy between microcosm and macrocosm,
hermetic medicine would decline in importance for
subsequent medical tradition, but in its focus on
chemical remedies, unprecedented at the time, the
new medicine would be most influential indeed. But
it’s really the former—the analogy—that’s most interesting to me. Here’s Paracelsus comparing a thunderstorm to epilepsy, the microcosmic fit:
When a thunderstorm is on its way, the weather
changes, the animals notice it and become restless.
So man too becomes terrified when he feels an
epileptic attach approaching [the so-called “aura,”
which predicted attack]. Then clouds gather in the
sky, while man’s eyesight becomes weakened and
he feels sleepy. Next comes the wind, sweeping
everything away; in the epileptic, the inner wind
makes his abdomen and neck swell. Now the thunder breaks forth, shaking heaven and earth; now
the epileptic is convulsed in all his limbs . . . . (qtd.
in Temkin 174)

And finally, “a stroke of lightning break[s] walls
and reduces everything to confusion—so the epileptic’s limbs are bent and even broken by the invisible
storm and lightning in his body” (qtd. in Temkin
174), the body essentially imploding.
To the audience of the The Tempest in 1611, or
such audience members who had a familiarity with
medicine—and there were perhaps not a few—the
shipwreck in certain ways would have been an enacting of an epileptic attack, in which the body, deprived
of the guiding rational faculty or faculties (remember
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the king being exiled below deck by the boatswain),
moved spasmodically and chaotically. The confused
cries of the sailors and everyone involved—we split!
we split!—enacted an epileptic body folding in on
itself, but also with an incredible release of energy:
what must it have been like to look on this catastrophe, these extremes of hope and fear (joking Gonzalo,
who is convinced that the destiny of the boatswain
will save them; the mariners, who even before the
“confused noise within” are wailing “All lost! to
prayers, to prayers! All lost!”).
It would have resonated with Cardano, who wrote
one of the first books, if not the first book on probability—it would have resonated with Cardano had he
been there. His autobiography records the following:
In 1525, the year in which I became rector [of
the University of Padua], I was almost drowned .
. . Rather reluctantly I had boarded a craft which
was transporting some horses for hiring. During
the crossing, the main mast, the rudder, and one
of the two oars with which the boat was manned,
were broken by storm . . . and at length night
overtook us. I reached Sirmione in safety after the
other passengers had abandoned even their faintest hopes, and I was all but desperate. Had our
embarkation been delayed but [a minute or so], we
should have [all] perished. (Cardano 92)

Confessing his cowardice, the charming Cardano
nevertheless sat down to eat a fish supper; his companions, on the other hand, had no appetite except,
as one biographer notes, the youth “whose rashness
led the party into danger, and whose courage found a
safe way out of it” (Morley 66).
Apparently in Cardano’s mind the episode was
linked to gaming, for immediately, in the next sentence, he launches into the following story: “Once
when I was in Venice on the birthday of the Blessed
Virgin, I lost some money while gambling; on the following day I lost the rest, for I was in the house of a
professional cheat” (92). Cardano erupts in a rage and
slashes the man’s face, though not deeply, he adds,
but eventually he wins the money back, plus the rings
and clothes he had lost previously, as well as most
if not all of the “cheat’s” money. Cardano demands
that the doors be unlocked, and “the master, seeing such a commotion and tumult in his household,
and anxiously fearing every moment’s delay, I judge,
because he had defrauded me in his own house with
his marked cards, after making a rapid calculation of
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the slight difference between what he had to gain or
what to lose, ordered the door to be opened” (93). The
master, the house’s man, knows that ultimately he
has the advantage.
The storm and the gaming table, the shipwreck
and the speculator: this has been an introduction to
an overarching project I’m calling “An Illegitimate
Child: Epilepsy, Gambling, and the Birth of Probability,” and I want to wrap-up by saying a few words
about that project, for with Cardano we have clearly
entered the world of probability—Cardano, who
some speculate was himself an childhood epileptic
since he reported recurring “visions” of “a veritable
chaos of innumerable objects rushing dizzily along
[before his eyes] en masse, without confusion among
themselves, yet with terrific speed” (131-132).
V. Probability, the Illegitimate Child
My current research responds to philosopher Ian
Hacking’s The Emergence of Probability, his touchstone
on the subject. According to Hacking, no one could
solve probability problems with any sort of consistency before the mid-seventeenth century because,
for all intents and purposes, there was no concept of
probability until that time, at least as we understand
it. And so the task of the historian of philosophy is
not to explain how earlier thinkers got it wrong but
rather how getting it right or wrong became possible
in the first place.
Modern probability is an essentially dual concept:
on the one hand, epistemological (“having to do with
degrees of belief”) and on the other hand, aleatory
(concerning “devices tending to produce stable longrun frequencies”) (Hacking 12). As to the origins of
such a concept, Hacking argues surprisingly (and in
large part, in my opinion, convincingly) that probability is “a child of the low sciences, such as alchemy
or medicine” (39) not the high theory of philosophy
or mathematics. Probability’s emergence—variously
spoken of as both a “birth” and a “mutation”—occurred through a transformation of the concept of
the sign, the “chief concept” of the low sciences, into
a new kind of evidence, “inductive” evidence (Hacking
38). Consequently, we must understand the role of
the sign particularly in respect to early modern medical theory, which was dominated at the time by the
alchemical tradition of Paracelsus and his followers,
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because this hermetic matrix accounts for the eventual duality of probability even after its birth.
The concept of probability having emerged, the
Port Royal Logicians were the first to measure it. To
represent epistemic probability on a numerical scale,
they used gaming as the model. “It may be tempting,”
Hacking remarks, “to infer that probability could be
measured only by using concepts devised for games of
chance,” but “that would be a mistake” (85). The proof
of this, in Hacking’s mind, is that Leibniz did so without any knowledge of the “doctrine of chances” (85).
Gaming, Hacking implies, played only an incidental
role in this transformation, which in part dispels the
mystery of why probability emerged only in Europe
in the seventeenth century when gaming is global
and most ancient (2). The barbaric gambling context
is simply unnecessary, almost an embarrassment, it
seems.
So if, in the main part, he’s right, then there are
two questions: why does “our” specific conception of
probability come about only in seventeenth-century
Europe when, on the one hand, medicine is ancient
and, on the other, gambling is equally ancient? Answer to the first question: Because a fundamentally
different kind of medicine was being practiced that
had not been practiced before, one not in the Aristotelian or Galenic traditions. But even if that’s
true—especially if that’s true—we need to look at the
way the hermetic doctors were actually employing
the concept of the “sign,” and this means their conception of the diseases they were combating (in the
preface to the second edition of his book, Hacking
himself admitted, in general, that he needed to have
been more historical than he was). The chief disease
was epilepsy, which truly did for the first time come
to the very forefront of Western medical debate. The
cutting-edge doctors understood this disease as a
“storm” (or sometimes a “quake” [Temkin 174], Poseidon the god of the sea classically being responsible
for “quakes”—a storm which was also a “quake”).
If you think of it in this way—the body being
wracked internally by a storm with its winds, a storm
which is also a “quake,” then it’s very natural, it seems
to me, to think of the epileptic fit as a kind of shipwreck. And so what we need to do, in my opinion, is
at the very least think through the epileptic debates
more thoroughly and historically, while at the same
time, more speculatively, we might consider represen-
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tations of shipwreck, for instance, that technically fall
outside the medical debate proper, but which may be
recalling it or in dialogue with it in another way, in a
way that they haven’t before. It’s not that any artistic
representation of a vessel wracked by storm somehow
says something about epilepsy, but rather that now
for the first time there’s probable reason to think so.
Hacking’s second question: why does “our” specific
conception of probability come about only in seventeenth-century Europe when gambling is most ancient? Hacking’s answer is simply that gambling and
probability aren’t as related as one might think. But
here’s an alternative to Hacking’s reasoning. We can
use what he did in the medical context as a model:
we might look for developments within the history
of gambling that occur only and significantly in early
to mid-seventeenth century Europe. And we find
one readily enough: the opening of the Ridotto, the
state-sanctioned gambling house, and the invention
of “legitimate,” mercantile gambling. As I’ve said, this
was unprecedented, idiosyncratic, and inaugurated an
explosion of gambling fever across the Continent and
in England; I believe that we need to consider the new
kind of gambling only now being practiced. Specifically, this means thinking through the—for lack of a
better word—“de-personalization” of the gambling
encounter and the ways in which the State was now
profiting from it, the self-interest it now had in the
miserable gamester.
VI. Implied Odds and Ends
Is the early modern rhetoric of mariner and gamester still alive? It is, at least, in contemporary talk
about the emergence of probability (although one
wonders about the degree of self-consciousness).
Consider, in closing, another interesting, popular
work on financial history, Niall Ferguson’s The Ascent
of Money. “The history of risk management,” he says,
“is one long struggle between our vain desire to be
financially secure—as secure as, say, a Scottish widow—and the hard reality that there really is no such
thing as ‘the future,’ singular” (Ferguson 178). The
moral of the story is that “there are only multiple,
unforeseeable futures, which will never lose their capacity to take us by surprise” (Ferguson 178). Immediately following these remarks, Ferguson meditates
on our own recent storm, Hurricane Katrina, before
seguing into a discussion of insurance and its origin
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in “Bottomry,” the insurance of merchant ships’ “bottoms” or hulls (186). This insurance was little more
than a wager, he says with a bit of a snort: “In truth,
all these forms of insurance—including even the
most sophisticated shipping insurance, were a form
of gambling” (Ferguson 188). The point here is to
contrast these uninformed practices with the emerging understanding of probability, which supposedly
would provide “an adequate theoretical basis for evaluating the risks that were being covered” (Ferguson
188). But the truth, as Ferguson well knows, is that
Sir Ernest Cassell, the gambler, was and is right: “Now
I am called a banker,” Cassell said, “but I have been
doing the same thing all along.”
If Ferguson has referred to our modern world as
“Planet Finance” (5), a world on the verge of wreck,
we could just as easily call it the “gaming planet,” a
more bullish phrase. And so I’ll hazard a guess: we
will understand the thing called modernity only by
investing in its philosophy and history and by gambling on its rhetoric, which is both less than philosophy or history and perhaps more. It means taking
“light” authors like Cotton, de la Vega, and Chancellor
as seriously as “legitimate” authors like Spinoza,
Shakespeare, and Hacking. It means getting serious
about play at the Ridotto and disillusioned about early
modern medicine. It means learning the lessons of
the speculator and storm.
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